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As a distinctive human undertaking, education carries risks that are deep and
enduring. It would be true in an everyday sense to say that these risks are often
overlooked, or unnoticed. It would be closer to the mark, however, to say that they
have been largely domesticated, or even insured against, by the institutional forms
education has historically taken, at least in Western civilization. Here, we are
clearly not talking about entrepreneurial risks, fueled as these are by the prospects
of material profit, though education has more than occasionally been used to pro-
mote a sense of individual entrepreneurial spirit. Nor are we talking of the risks
an individual might take to achieve fame and glory. Nor yet are we talking of
the risks a group of people might take to win human rights or political free-
doms. Rather, the risks we are calling attention to here are those that are inescap-
ably — not just contingently — connected with the deliberate promotion of
human learning. At stake is nothing less than what we become as human beings
as a consequence of what we experience as learners. Such consequences include
coming to understand and judge ourselves, our human significance, and our pros-
pects in certain ways rather than in others; coming to understand and judge others
and their significance in particular ways; and coming to understand and judge the
merits of learning itself in its various forms and possibilities.
For teachers such risks include those of setting themselves and their knowledge
forth for examination; of being surpassed, pulled up short, or embarrassed before
one’s students; of failing despite one’s best efforts on behalf of one’s students; and of
exerting influence on a daily basis in ways that may well have unforeseen or im-
measurable consequences. For students the risks include those of possibly failing in
their studies, of being rejected by their teachers or fellow students, or of having to
endure less-than-inspiring teachers. For parents there are the many risks associated
with entrusting their children to a particular school or teacher. For governments
there are the risks associated with allowing (or forbidding) educational institutions
the freedom to pursue teaching and learning as an endeavor with its own distinctive
responsibilities, separate from those of the state, the ruling party, or any other inter-
est group. These examples illustrate that the risks of education are different in na-
ture and scope from the more calculable risks that are encountered in other fields of
human endeavor, such as business, engineering, law, or even medicine.
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Plato was among the first and the most influential to suggest that the stakes
in education are too high to allow the control and management of this undertaking
to be left in the hands of teachers. Arising from his conviction that the independ-
ent schools of the sophists had done much to engender a pervasive decadence in
Athenian culture, Plato carried out probing and insightful studies into the risks of
education. As a result of these efforts, he devised comprehensive educational pro-
visions that sought to rid education of undesirable possibilities and to present it
with challenges that were worthy of the efforts of learners and their teachers.1 For
Plato, the worth of an educational goal depended on whether it was informed by a
higher truth, according to his own intricate metaphysical theory. On his view, the
conduct of education is best entrusted not to teachers but to a higher authority
possessed of such truth: philosopher-rulers.
Despite his concerns about Plato’s metaphysics, Aristotle largely agreed with
Plato where the control of education was concerned. Notwithstanding the inci-
siveness and subtlety of his insights into human friendship (philia) and deliber-
ative reasoning (phronesis), Aristotle’s views on the conduct of education were
forthright and echoed strongly Plato’s concern with removing undesirable risks. In
his Politics, Aristotle argued that ‘‘since the polis as a whole has a single aim, the
education of all must be one and the same.’’ To this he added: ‘‘the supervision of
this education must be public and not private, as it is in the present system, under
which everyone looks after his own children privately and gives them any private
instruction he thinks proper.’’ Aristotle’s justification for such a stance is much
more concise than that of Plato and appears in the text of Politics almost as an in-
cidental remark: ‘‘Besides, it is wrong for any citizen to think that he belongs to
himself. All must be considered as belonging to the polis: for each man is a part of
the polis, and the treatment of the part is necessarily determined by the treatment
of the whole.’’2
This parallel between Plato and Aristotle is significant for a number of reasons
that are pertinent to the essays that follow. First, it marks the surrender of the in-
herent risks of education to the will of a paternalistic power. Second, it marks a
departure from the independent and individualistic, though scarcely less paternal-
istic, style of the schools of the sophists. Third, it involves a negation, in both style
and substance, of something that might otherwise have become a distinctive and
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vibrant educational inheritance in the West: the venturesome and self-critical kind
of learning that the historical Socrates sought to promote, with fellow residents
and visitors alike, in the public places of ancient Athens.
Centuries later, once Christianity had become the religion of an empire that
for a time included most of Western civilization, the paternalistic rather than the
Socratic precedent became the decisive one where education was concerned. That
precedent became infused afresh with religious doctrines, however. For the most
part these doctrines were not the practical tenets of Christianity as a religion of
love and reconciliation; rather, they were doctrines of an ascetic kind, associated
with the more severe theological conclusions found in the writings of St. Paul and
St. Augustine. And the consequences of such developments were far-reaching
indeed. As historians of education have pointed out, an ecclesiastical monopoly
became established in ‘‘Christendom’’ for almost a thousand years. Accordingly,
the spirit and substance of Western learning became aligned with church doctrines
and interests.3
In this long history, paternalistic standpoints have been legion. For the sake of
clarity, these standpoints can be described collectively as measures that sought to
safeguard learners and their teachers from risks deemed undesirable and to impose
penalties for embracing such risks. A study of this history reveals, however, that
church authorities were themselves rarely free from the risk that some emergent
intellectual movement might upset an apparently settled climate of acquiescence
or might break apart a dominant orthodoxy. The following examples illustrate a
few of the diverse ways in which the risks of learning provoked to critical action
both intellect and sensibility among successive generations of learners and teach-
ers. Recall, for instance, the turbulence occasioned in twelfth-century Paris by
Peter Abelard’s efforts to open for debate among his students questions that eccle-
siastical authorities had long regarded as settled. More striking in a practical sense
are the fruits that such a questioning kind of learning produced, evident for exam-
ple in the incisive and spirited letters of the adult He´loise, possibly the best of his
former students, to Abelard himself.4 Then there are the writings of Erasmus of
Rotterdam, most notably Praise of Folly, which sought through devices such as
irony, humor, and artifice to point learning in directions more worthy of learners’
efforts than those of a prevalent and predictable scholasticism.5 And, of course,
there are the examples of Luther, Copernicus, Galileo, and countless (less well-
known) others, who were well aware that their various paths of inquiry involved
dangerous risks, but who still pursued those paths in the hope that the experience
of learning might bring a greater abundance, and fewer restrictions, to succeeding
generations.
3. William Boyd and Edmund J. King, The History of Western Education (London: Adam and Charles
Black, 1966), 101.
4. Betty Radice, ed., The Letters of Abelard and Heloise (London: Penguin Books, 1999); and Constant J.
Mews and Neville Chiavaroli, eds., The Lost Love Letters of Abelard and Heloise (Basingstoke, England:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
5. Desiderius Erasmus, Praise of Folly [1515], trans. Betty Radice (London: Penguin Books, 1999).
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In the more secular times that followed the era of Enlightenment and Revolu-
tion (English, American, French), figures who rose to eminence in accepting and
engaging the inherent risks of education were no less courageous, and no less ener-
getic. For instance, Wilhelm von Humboldt, as Prussian minister for education, ac-
complished something unprecedented when he established the University of Berlin
in 1809–10. Here was an institution that would be maintained by the public purse,
would pursue scientific (wissenschaftliche) research as a form of liberal learning,
and would be free of state control. In challenging both the authoritarian legacies of
the Prussian monarchy and the reality of Napoleonic imperial power, Humboldt
boldly envisaged the new institution as a center of academic freedom and as the
‘‘mother of all modern universities.’’ A similar hope and boldness is evident in Tho-
mas Jefferson’s efforts to establish a nondenominational university in the United
States, the University of Virginia. In a letter to William Roscoe, dated December 27,
1820, he declared that ‘‘this institution will be based on the illimitable freedom of
the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead,
nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it.’’6
Of course Humboldt’s university, and the many that were later modeled on it,
often fell short of the lofty ideals of their founders. And it took more than a little
time for the ‘‘freedom of the human mind’’ at the University of Virginia to lead it
to the point of acknowledging that female and black students should be admitted
on the same basis as white male students. Although many might regard these
shortcomings as signs of failure, it is more instructive to understand them as so-
bering pieces of historical evidence that also suggest something of acute philosoph-
ical and educational significance: Perhaps the risks of education that are most
worth taking are those that humanely bring to light undetected but invidious pre-
conceptions and that enable learning in any field to proceed as a distinctively hu-
man endeavor with a perceptive sense of its own possibilities and limitations. The
taking of such risks in a responsible way would thereby reclaim something genu-
inely Socratic. It would seek to deepen our awareness of the reciprocal nature and
the illimitable scope of the work that education itself must attempt. This clearly
distinguishes the enduring interests of education from the interests of politics, or
religion, or commerce.
No less than their ecclesiastical predecessors in Western Christendom, the
secular educational authorities of very many Western democracies find it difficult
to acknowledge this important distinction. For these contemporary authorities,
however, the risks that are to be kept at bay, and those that are to be encouraged,
reveal the rise to dominance of a different kind of orthodoxy, one that places its
strongest faith in various forms of managerial prowess. On this orthodoxy, the
managers of educational institutions are charged by their political masters with
ensuring that each student’s progress will be regularly ascertained by the use of
objective tests; that each school’s performance on such tests will be made public
6. Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe, December 27, 1820, http://www.monticello.org/reports/quotes/
uva.html.
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as an index of success or failure, so as to enable parents a clear basis for choosing
among schools; that schools will have built-in systems to make them effective
learning organizations; that schools will make sure that the learning efforts of stu-
dents complement the top priorities of social and economic policy; and that insti-
tutions of higher learning will align their efforts to the requirements of economic
and technological advance.
A strong argument can be made that the purposes just listed are worthy of
public support in a democratic society. Such concerns as providing adequate
appraisal of students’ accomplishments, ensuring accountability to the public, de-
veloping valid procedures for the evaluation and improvement of educational prac-
tice, embodying justice and equity in the provision of educational opportunities,
identifying and providing for students’ vocational potentials, and making decisive
contributions to a country’s economic well-being clearly mark important dimen-
sions of education as a public concern. But they do not encompass the heart of
education; indeed, they contribute to a displacement of that heart, to a disfigure-
ment of education itself, when they regard it as a system in which certain risks
(the inherent uncertainties of education) should be minimized while a capacity
for other kinds of risk-taking (individualistic-entrepreneurial) should be promoted.
Moreover, this problem is compounded where technocratic thinking furnishes
an elaborate machinery of management that educational authorities can
deploy — earnestly or otherwise — at the pleasure of the current government in
power. As a number of the following essays show, the field of higher education in-
ternationally has become a particular casualty of such displacement. The public
purposes of education achieve a decidedly different significance, however, if they
are engaged and pursued in a hospitable context — that is, a context in which what
we have called the enduring interests of education are clearly acknowledged as a
distinct public office or field of endeavor. But then a certain measure of risk must
be tolerated, even embraced.
The reluctance, or refusal, of so many governments to grant unambiguous rec-
ognition to such an office could be described as a lingering disappointment of one
of the chief hopes of the Enlightenment. Currents of thinking that run from Rous-
seau through Kant and Humboldt to Dewey conceive of education as an emancipa-
tion from traditional custodianships of intellectual sensibility and as a pathway to
human flourishing, both personal and social. And clearly we have become accus-
tomed to a wide range of rights and liberties that would have been no more than
idealistic hopes in premodern times. Yet, the Greek-Roman-ecclesiastical concep-
tion of education as an office that is essentially subordinate to the will of a higher
institutional authority has endured. The occupants of the seats of power in such
higher authorities have changed, as have the things that are to be regarded as risks.
But despite many generations of transition since the high Enlightenment, the basic
conception of education as an instrument of such authority survives. More signifi-
cantly, in a postmodern age, the incarnation of this idea is more mercenary than
religious. Accordingly, against the newer form of educational orthodoxy, the possi-
bilities offered by Friedrich Nietzsche strike many, including some of the authors
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of the contributions here, as particularly incisive. Nietzsche’s themes of the posi-
tive appreciation of suffering and endurance, of u¨bermensch as a form of responsi-
bility that withstands and confronts a prevalent nihilism but without subjective/
heroic overtones, and of taking seriously the depths of ignorance that are the dark
side of unprecedented knowledge are just a few examples of such possibilities.
In any case the essays that follow provide revealing explorations of how the
risks of human learning are conceived today and of how the power of the higher in-
stitutional authorities that seek to control education is currently exercised. The pur-
pose of these explorations is not to disclose the unhappiness of education’s current
lot. Undoubtedly, the following analyses highlight much that is amiss with prevail-
ing approaches to shaping and implementing educational policies in many Western
countries. But their main purpose is to heighten awareness that educational practice
is sustained and renewed by an inspired human commitment and to identify some
forms of thought and action that are most worthy of such commitment.
In the opening contribution Michael Peters draws on the work of Ulrich Beck,
for whom the historically important transition is not from industrial society to
postindustrial or postmodern society, but to ‘‘risk society.’’7 In this context the
driving logic is no longer class politics as an organizing principle but rather socially
manufactured risk and risk management. Such a ‘‘risk society’’ is put in place
through actuarial mechanisms, and it emphasizes the importance of all types of in-
surance as a means of reducing risk to the individual (in such areas as employment,
education, accident, security, and retirement). The regulation of risk takes place
through insurance and the ‘‘responsibilization’’ of the individual consumer. Peters
calls this phenomenon a prudentialization of social regulation and explores the
strategic role educational policy has played in advancing it.
Richard Smith’s contribution also concentrates on the critical purposes of the
university. According to Smith, the manner in which the modernist quest for
equity and efficiency is pursued drives contingency and meaningful educational
risk from the university. Along with these much else disappears: chiefly, the possi-
bility of a relation between teacher and taught that may be the basis for realizing
forms of human freedom that otherwise cannot be realized, or perhaps even imag-
ined. Such freedoms, Smith argues, are associated with live and autonomous
teachers, as distinct from interactive learning packages. And to acknowledge this
in practice, he points out, involves a considerable risk — that of exposing what
one loves to scrutiny and perhaps rejection. To eliminate such vulnerability from
education, Smith concludes, is to abandon education itself for a counterfeit.
Stefan Ramaekers investigates the ‘‘empowerment’’ approach that has now be-
come almost a commonplace of educational correctness. He shows how this con-
ception of educational support for families, because of the very language in which
it is framed (parent-as-participant, educator-as-facilitator), is one-sided. It invites
the mistaken idea that the professional educator seeks, and should seek, to assume
an attitude of abstinence. Ramaekers argues that the educator must speak — must
7. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992).
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own his or her voice and embrace the risks of venturing it — in order to elicit those
voices (‘‘e-vocation’’) that might otherwise remain inarticulate or disabled. This, he
shows, is not ‘‘speaking on behalf of others’’ but helping others to discover which
among the many internal voices vying for expression are ones for them to own here
and now.
Paul Smeyers deals with the illusion that ‘‘theory’’ creates in education: that
problems can be solved once and for all, and that matters can thus be made more
‘‘manageable.’’ His investigation into the nature of theories (both quantitative and
qualitative) in empirical research leads him to argue that the best theory can do is
illuminate particulars, as distinct from discovering something universal. Ignoring
the particularities of educational practice, he points out, puts at risk the kind
of thinking that is most appropriate to understanding that practice itself. He sug-
gests that philosophy of education has hardly been more effective in this regard
than have theories in empirical research. Ultimately, Smeyers concludes that, in-
stead of being neutral or only looking for presuppositions, anything that is to count
as educational theory should show how things ‘‘have to be.’’ This involves the in-
escapability of offering a particular stance, a particular judgment, a commitment
to this or that in life.
Pa´draig Hogan addresses two tendencies in his essay: first, the tendency of pre-
modern forms of authority to domesticate or otherwise control human learning as
a search for truth; and, second, the postmodern tendency to eschew that search it-
self as misguided. Hogan argues that if the search for truth is discarded as a pur-
pose of learning, then something irreplaceable is undermined from the start —
namely, the integrity of learning itself as a worthy and enduring, but essentially
risky, undertaking. His position is that in order to understand human learning as a
search for truth, one must abandon the hope of attaining a complete metaphysical
picture or epistemologically secured certainty. Rather, it is to experience firsthand
the endless interplay of limitation and promise within the search itself. To engage
in such action, Hogan concludes, is to be enjoined to practice this search afresh
with others in a way that is both venturesome and critically disciplined, a way that
acknowledges, and learns amid, the plurality of human perspectives.
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